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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the decision of the Court of Appeals, (a) that 
the trial court did not err in refusing to allow evidence con-
cerning plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt and (b) that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a 
new trial due to juror use of a dictionary relative to the word 
"proximate" conflict with a decision of this Court,as required by 
Rule 43(2) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in order to 
grant a writ of certiorari. 
2. Did the Court of Appeals, (a) in excluding evidence 
of plaintiffs failue to wear a seat belt and (b) in ruling on 
juror use of a dictionary relative to the word "proximate" decide 
an important question of state law which has not been but should 
be settled by this Court, as required by Rule 43(4) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in order to grant a Writ of 
Certiorari . 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
In Hillier v. Lamborn, 63 Utah Adv. Rep 17 (Ct. 
App. 8/5/87) 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987), a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit A, the Court of Appeals unaminously held that 
the trial court did not err 1) in refusing to allow evidence con-
cerning plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt; 2) in failing to 
grant a new trial due to a juror's use of a dictionary relative 
to the word "proximate". 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The defendant's brief in this regard is correct with 
the following exceptions: a) the Order denying defendant's 
Petition for Rehearing was dated August 25, 1987, not August 26, 
1987 and the Petition for Rehearing was filed by defendant on 
October 12, 1987, (although apparently docketed on October 9, 
1987) and was hand delivered to plaintiff's counsel on October 
13, 1987. Based thereon, it may be questionable as to whether 
defendant has properly complied with the jurisdiction 
requirements. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Karen Hillier brought this negligence action 
against defendant William J. Lamborn to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained in an automobile collision, on or about 
11/13/82, near Centerville, Davis County, Utah. The action was 
tried in the district court to a jury, Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby presiding, on March 2, 5 and 7, 1984. On 3/7/84, the 
jury returned its special verdict finding defendant 80% and 
plaintiff 2056 negligent in proximately causing the collision. R. 
115-117. The jury further determined the total dollar amount of 
general and special damages sustained by plaintiff as a direct 
result of the accident was $272,943.38. Ld. After adjustments 
not relevant to defendant's appeal and reduction for plaintiff's 
comparative fault, judgment was finally entered against 
defendant, on or about 3/27/84, in the total amount of 
$221,209.41 R. 327-330. On 4/17/84, defendant filed his motion 
for new trial, or alternatively, for remittitur. R. 367-401. 
The grounds upon which the motion was based, were virtually 
identical to those raised in his brief on appeal. On 4/17/84, 
following a hearing, the district court denied defendant's motion 
on each of the grounds asserted. (Exhibit D.) On 5/15/84, 
defendant filed his notice of appeal. This Court, however, 
subsequently dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, 
although it was later reinstated upon rehearing. 
This case was assigned to the Court of appeals which 
rendered its opinion on 8/5/87, affirming the decision of the 
trial court and the jury verdict. On 8/25/87, the Court of 
Appeals denied defendant's Petition for Rehearing. (Exhibit B) 
Thereafter, on 10/9/87, the Court of Appeals issued a Remittitur, 
(Exhibit C) and on 10/12/87, defendant filed his Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts supported by the record, and undisputed which 
are relevant to the issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. On 11/13/82, at about 8:30 a.m., plaintiff was 
driving her 1978 Chevrolet south on the frontage road east of 
1-15 between Farmington and Centerville, at about 45 m.p.h. in a 
50 m.p.h. zone (Tr.172-177), when defendnat, who was road hunting 
for pheasants (Tr.192-193, 208, 377), while driving his 1974 Ford 
pickup truck south at about 10-12 m.p.h. on the same road 
entirely on the shoulder of the road completely to the right of 
the fog line painted on the asphalt (Tr.175-176) , when suddenly 
and without warning or signal, defendant steered his truck into 
plaintiff's lane directly in front of her, when she was within 
4-5 car lengths of passing him (Tr.175-178), which according to 
plaintiff's expert witnesses, Frank Grant and David Stephens, did 
not give plaintiff time to take evasive action to avoid a 
collision. (Tr.247-248, 301-302) If defendant did not pull in 
front of plaintiff, she had plenty of room to pass in her own 
lane without any need to steer her car to the left into the 
northbound lane of traffic. (Tr.175-176, 185-186) 
2. As a result of the impact, plaintiff's car spun 
around and then rolled over, coming to rest upside down. 
(Tr.204-205, 351-352) Plaintiff was thrown from the vehicle onto 
the highway. As a result of the accident, plaintiff suffered 
serious and permanent injuries and damages. (Tr.33-^2, 51-52, 
68-72, 83-89, 133-171, 408-420) In ruling on defendant's motion 
for a new trial or in the alternative a remittitur, the court 
stated that 
"the jury certainly found damages that were within 
reason of the testimony that was given. .They could 
well have found more than they did and still been with-
in reason. So there is no grounds for the court to 
grant a remittitur on that." (Exhibit D) . 
Even defendant's counsel admitted in opening statement that plain-
tiff had been "badly injured in the automobile accident," "no 
doubt about it." (Tr.24) 
3. Defendant did not affirmatively plead the seat belt 
defense in his answer to plaintiff's complaint. 
4. Defendant did not raise the seat belt defense as an 
issue at the pretrial hearing or in the Pretrial Order. Nothing 
is mentioned about seat belts or mitigation of damages under 
"Defendant's Claims," "Contested Issues of Fact" or "Contested 
Issues of Law." A copy of the Judge's notes at the pretrial 
hearing and the Pretrial Order are attached as Exhibits E and F 
respectively. 
5. Defendant raised the seat belt issue for the first 
time on the second day of trial. 
6. Defendant, not plaintiff, first broached the seat 
belt issue at trial. In defendant's cross-examination of Dr. 
Robert Jordan, an orthopedic surgeon who treated plaintiff at the 
emergency room, his counsel qualified the witness as an expert in 
trauma medicine and asked him, over plaintiff's objection, 
several questions several questions relating to his opinion 
whether plaintiff sustained her orthopedic injuries inside her 
car or outside of it during the rollover. (Tr.74-78) The 
obvious intent of that line of questioning, of course, was to 
sensitize the jury to the fact plaintiff was not wearing her seat 
belt and to force them to consider that some of plaintiff's 
injuries would not have been sustained but for her failure in 
that regard. 
7. During plaintiff's testimony, her counsel asked her 
whether her car was equipped with a seat belt and if so, whether 
she was wearing it at the time of the collision. (Tr.175) Defen-
dant 's counsel did not object to these questions on any basis, 
including any alleged violation of the pretrial order. There is 
no order in the record, pretrial or otherwise, which prohibits 
plaintiff from testifying that she was not wearing her seat belt. 
Later, after the parties had argued their respective positions to 
the Court on the seat belt defense, and following the court's 
ruling, defendant's counsel for the first time urged the court to 
reconsider its ruling on the basis plaintiff had opened the door 
to seat belt evidence in her testimony. Specifically, the record 
discloses: 
MR. MOHRMAN: Your honor, if it may please the Court, I 
forgot to mention one issue that I think I need to get 
on the record, if you donyt mind. 
THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead. 
MR. MORHMAN: It's also our position that the plain-
tiff's attorney raised the issue of seat belts in their 
questioning in their case in chief and, therefore, they 
are precluded from arguing against us with regard to 
proper proof on that issue. (Tr.281-282) 
8. There is no jury instruction in the record proposed 
by defendant on the seat belt issue, other than one which simply 
raises the issue as one of defendant's claims. Tr.173. Defend-
ant's counsel did request "a jury instruction" on the seat belt 
defense orally one time before the jury retired. Tr.280. No 
written instruction, however, was submitted. 
9. After the jurors retired, one of their number appar-
ently requested the bailiff to supply them with a dictionary. 
The only evidence in the record which details what the bailiff 
did in response to the request, and what the jurors did as a 
result, is set forth in the affidavits of two jurors, to wit, 
the foreperson of the jury, Kathy 0. Davis, who stated that the 
"extraneous information received provided no new information to 
the jury," and Frank Arnold, who was the only juror who disagreed 
with the jury's determination on the issue of comparative fault 
and its award of general damages. (Tr.614-615) The record does 
not contain the actual definition of "proximate" the jury read 
nor does it identify the dictionary used. 
10. In any event, the district court's first instruc-
tion to the jury admonished jurors as follows: 
"it is your duty . . . to follow the law as the Court 
states it to you, regardless of what you personally 
believe the law is or ought to be." . . . n[t]he 
authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary power, 
but must be exercised . . . in accordance with rules 
of law stated to you." (Tr.235) 
There is no evidence any juror violated his or her oath to do 
just that. In the courts eleventh instruction (Exhibit G) the 
jury was advised as to proximate cause as follows: 
"The proximate case of an injury is that cause which, 
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and 
without which the result would not have occurred. It 
is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily sets 
in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING IT TO ALLOW EVIDENCE CON-
CERNING PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO WEAR A SEAT BELT DOES 
NOT CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT AS REQUIRED 
BY RULE 43(2) AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN IMPORTANT 
QUESTION OF STATE LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE 
SETTLED BY THIS COURT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 43(4). 
Defendant's argument that the Court of Appeals decision 
is in conflict with Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 
(Utah 1984) or with § 78-27-37 (1953 as amended) is 
without merit. Acculog was not a seat belt case. In Acculog, 
the Supreme Court held that 
"where it was found that van had been negligently 
serviced and that such negligence was proximate cause 
of fire and damage sustained, plaintiffs' failure to 
carry fire extinguisher in van was not contributing 
factor in causing injury, and trial court erred in sub-
mitting to jury question of plaintiffs' comparative 
negligence.f! 
Id. at 728. (Emphasis added.) 
The majority opinion analyzed the law in this area as follows: 
"A plaintiff cannot be held to be contributorily negli-
gent unless his negligence is causally connected to the 
plaintiff?s injury." 
* * * 
In other words, where plaintiff's negligent conduct was 
a contributing factor in causing the injury, compara-
tive negligence becomes a defense for the defendant." 
* * * 
"We are not concerned in comparative negligence law with the 
cause of the damage, but with the cause of the injury 
instead. 
The "injury" is sometimes used in the sense 
of "damage," as including the harm orloss of 
which compensation is sought, and has been 
defined as damage resulting from an unlawful 
act; but in strict legal significance, there 
is, properly speaking, a material distinction 
between the two terms in that injury means 
something done against the right of the 
party, producing damage, whereas damage is 
the harm, detriment, or loss sustained by 
reason of the injury. Clark v. 
Cassetty, 71 N.M. 89, 376 P.2d 37 (1962). 
Id. at 730. (Emphasis added.) 
(New Mexico rejected the so called seat belt defense in 
Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476 (1985).) 
Given the manner in which the court applied the foregoing rule to 
the facts in Acculog, supra, it stands to reason that unless 
a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt in a case like the 
present one proximately causes injury (the accident which pro-
duced her damages), all evidence with respect thereto should be 
excluded from the liability determination. In the case at bar, 
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt did not contribute in 
causing the injury, i.e., the accident. 
It should be noted that the majority opinion was 
written by Justice Howe with Justices Hall and Durham concurring 
in the majority opinion and Justice Stewart concurring in the 
result. Justice Oaks, the only one of the five Justices no 
longer on the bench, wrote a separate concurring opinion, not 
concurred in by the other Justices and thus Justice Oaks 
concurring opinion is simply dicta and not the law of the state 
of Utah. 
In the majority opinion, the court stated as follows: 
"The trial court expressed the opinion that there might 
be a question of mitigation of damages, but that issue 
is not before us and we decline to address it." Id. at 
731• (Emphasis added.) 
Since the Supreme Court did not even address the mitigation of 
damages issue or seat belt defense in the majority opinion in 
Acculog, supra, there is no way that the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in the subject case to affirming the trial 
court's decision to exclude evidence of plaintiff's failure to 
wear a seat belt (a mitigation of damages sort of defense) could 
be in conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court as 
required by Rule 43(2) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
In the subject case, the Court of Appeals held: 
"The majority of other jurisdictions have held that 
evidence of nonuse of seat belt on the issue of mitiga-
tion of damages is inadmissable. (cases omitted) We 
agree with the rationale of those cases and hold 
similarly that seat belt evidence is inadmissable in 
this case which arose prior to the inactment of the 
present Utah Statute." (Exhibit A) 
By judicial decision, at least 20 states, have rejected 
the so-called seat belt defense, including virtualy all the 
Intermountain states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Washington and Oregon.) Additionally there are 
many states which have abolished the seat belt defense by statute. 
Only three states have adopted it. (Florida, New York and 
Wisconsin). The sheer magnitude of the majority is overwhelming. 
See pages 53-55 of plaintiff's original brief for the case 
citations and an in depth analysis of the cases which discloses 
that the cases cited by defendant on pages 10 and 11 of his brief 
do not stand for the proposition advanced either because 1) they 
have little or nothing to do with the seat belt defense 2) they 
are federal cases attempting to predict state law which subse-
quently proved inaccurate 3) they are appellate cases subsequent-
ly overruled by a higher court or 4) the statements in the cases 
with respect to the seat belt defense are dicta. 
The reasons most often found in the cases rejecting the 
seat belt defense are as follows: 
1. As to why they refuse to allow it on issue of 
comparative negligence, the court's reason: (a) Plaintiff has no 
statutory or common law duty to wear a seat belt; (b) the failure 
to wear a seat belt is rarely a proximate cause of a accident; 
(c) seat belts are not widely used by the public (75% of 
motorists don't wear them); (d) it is for the legislature to 
decide, not the courts. 
2. As to why they refuse to allow it on the issue of 
mitigation of damages, the court's reason (a) the duty to miti-
gate arises after plaintiff has been injured, not before; (b) 
plaintjrff has no duty to anticipate defendant's negligence; (c) 
defendant would be allowed a windfall by dodging a substantial 
portion of his liability; and (d) trial complication and jury 
confusion—battle of experts, crash helmets, armoured cars, air 
bags, etc. 
At the time of this accident, 11/13/82, Utah had no 
statute mandating the wearing of seat belts for drivers of motor 
vehicles. Since this accdent, and during the pendancy of this 
appeal, the Utah Legislature enacted in 1986 the "Motor Vehicle 
Seat Belt Usage Act," Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-181 et seq. 
(1952 and 1986 Supp.). Section 41-6-186 of that act 
states as follows: 
The failure to wear a seat belt does not constitute 
contributory or comparative negligence, and may not be 
introduced as evidence in any civil litigation on the 
issue of injuries or on the issue of mitigation of 
damages. 
Thus, since the Utah legislature has already settled 
this question on matters arising after the effective date of the 
statute, there does not exist "an important question of state law 
which has not been but should be settled by this court" as requir-
ed by Rule 43(4) of the Rule of the Utah Supreme Court. 
This recent legislation is significant for the fol-
lowing additional reasons: 
(1) It clearly demonstrates the legislative policy of 
the State of Utah is not to allow the failure to use seat belts 
as a factor in determining fault or damages in civil litigation. 
It does this even in the face of other provisions of the same 
act which make seat belt usage mandatory. In light of the policy 
of Utah's seat belt law, it is difficult to comprehend the logic, 
equity or fairness that would allow the failure to use seat belts 
as a factor in determining fault or damage prior to the existence 
of any such statutory duty; 
(2) The prohibition against using evidence of the fail-
ure to use seat belts in civil litigation is wholly ocnsistent 
with the position taken by plaintiff as to the common law of the 
State of Utah at the time this matter went to trial; and 
(3) The prohibition against using evidence of failure 
to use seat belts codified by the Utah State Legislature is 
strong reason to sustain the decision of the trial court below 
which, like the legislature, determined that such evidence was 
inadmissable, especially where there was no statutory duty to 
wear seat belts at the time of the accident. 
In Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476 
(1985), the New Mexico Supreme Court held as follows: 
. • • We believe that the creation of a "seat belt 
defense" is a matter for the legislature, not for the 
judiciary. 
Thomas, 695 P.2d at 477. 
The above holding in Thomas, provides a strong 
basis for courts to refrain from judicially creating a "seat belt 
defense," especially where in this case it would have no 
prospective application now that the Utah Legislature has spoken 
on this issue. 
The Illinois Supreme Court recently found itself in an 
analogous position. In Clarkson v. Wright, 108 111.2d 129, 
90 111.Dec. 950, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985), the Illinois Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of the existence of a "seat belt 
defense" where the Illinois Legislature, like the Utah Legisla-
ture, had enacted legislation (while the Clarkson case was 
on appeal) making the use of seat belts mandatory but prohibiting 
the admission of evidence of failure to use seat belts in civil 
litigation. The Court overruled several Illinois1 appellate 
level decisions holding that such evidence was admissable. It is 
significant to note that five of these Illinois Appellate Court 
decisions were relied on by defendant in this case at pages 25 
and 26 of defendant's original brief. Prior to addressing the 
effect of the Illinois1 seat belt legislation passed during the 
pendancy of the Clarkson appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court 
justified its rejection of the appellate court's decision 
stating: 
We agree with the majority view that failure to use a 
seat belt was not negligence or contributory negligence 
which caused the accident out of which plaintiff's 
injuries arose. At most, the failure to use a seat 
belt created a condition which possibility may have 
increased the severity of plaintiff's injuries. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Clarkson, N.E.2d at 269. 
The Illinois court went on to explain that: 
Once plaintiff suffered an injruy, there was, of 
course, a duty to mitigate the damages in any reason-
able way possible. That duty to mitigate damages which 
arose subsequent to the injury, is, however, clearly 
distinguishable from any duty which existed prior to 
the injury here; there was no statutory duty to wear a 
seat belt and the presence of the seat belt in the 
automobile did not create the duty to wear it any more 
than would the presence in the automobile of a 
protective helmet create a duty to wear that. We find 
no authority which imposed on plaintiff the duty to 
anticipate and guard against defendant's negligence. 
We conclude that the rule followed in the majority of 
jurisdictions which have considered the question 
[citations omitted] that evidence of failure to wear a 
seat belt should not be admitted with respect to either 
the question of liability or damages is a sound one 
which should be followed in this jurisdiction. 
Clarkson, 483 N.E.2d at 270. (Emphasis added.) 
In concluding its decision, the Clarkson court noted that 
its decision was in full accord with the enactment by the 
Illinois Legislature of the provision prohibiting the 
introduction of failure to use seat belts into evidence in civil 
litigation. 
It would be gross error to reject the authority of the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in this county, including 
virtually all of the Intermountain and western states, by adopt-
ing a rule of law, i.e., the seat belt defense, fraught with 
unfairness, injustice and significant policy and practical 
problems, particularly where, as in this case, the defense (a) 
was not pled; (b) was not framed in the pretrial order; (c) was 
not embodied in any proposed instruction of defendant; and (d) 
otherwise was raised for the first time, according to the record, 
on the second day of trial. Based on the facts in the subject 
case, defendant would have been precluded from using the seat 
belt defense even in Florida, a jurisdiction that allows the 
defense under proper circumstances. In Protective Casualty 
Insurance Co. v. Killane, 459 So.2d 1037 (Fla 1984), where the 
defendant (1) did not mention the seat belt defense in his 
Answer; (2) did not list it in the Pretrial Order; and (3) did 
not mention it until the 1st day of trial, the court held defend-
and could not present evidence of plaintiff's failure to wear a 
seat belt for consideration in assessing paintiff's damages. 
In the subject case, defendant argues that plaintiff's 
counsel opened the door to such evidence by asking plaintiff if the 
her car had seat belts and if she was wearing it at the time of 
accident. Defendant's position is without merit for three reasons: 
(1) It is a well-recognized rule in this state that, !f[c]urative 
admissibility of evidence is a matter withint the discretion of 
the trial court, and we will not reverse that decision absent an 
abuse of discretion." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 
682 P.2d 832 at 840; see also, Leger Construction Co. Inc. 
v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1977). 
(2) The record reflects that defendant did not object on the 
ground of curative admissibility of the seat belt evidence at or 
before the time the district court made its ruling. (Tr.175) His 
first objection on that ground, according to the record, was some 
time after the court had already ruled. (Tr.281-282) As a 
result, he was precluded from raising the issue on appeal by the 
clear mandate of Rule 46, U.R.Civ.P. which provides 
ff[i]t is sufficient that a party, at the time the 
ruling or oder of the court is made or sought, makes 
known to the court the action which he desires the 
court to take or his objection to the action of the 
court, and his grounds therefor". . . (The) burden is 
always on the party objecting to make certain that the 
record adequately preserves an objection or argument 
for review in the event of an appeal." (Emphasis added) 
(3) Defendant cites no cases in which this Court reversed the 
district court's determination on curative evidence under 
circumstances similar to those of the present case. His failure 
to do so suggests the deference this Court gives to the district 
court on the issue of curative admissibility. In this case, even 
assuming arguendo that plaintiff is responsbile for opening the 
door on the issue, which plaintiff denies, the district court's 
refusal to grant defendant a new trial on this point was not an 
abuse of discretion for several reasons. Plaintiff only opened 
the door to the very limited issue of whether she was wearing a 
seat belt at the time of the accident. To open the door to that 
issue is not the same as opening the door to the issues of the 
legal effect of her failure to wear her seat belt or the causal 
connection between such failure and some or all of the injuries 
she sustained. Moreover, even a perfuntory review of the record 
on the issue clearly indicates plaintiff's counsel only asked the 
questions in response to defendant's inference on cross examina-
tion of Dr. Jordan that she was not wearing a seat belt 
(Tr.74-78), to show plaintiff had nothing to hide and for the 
purpose of accurately describing the accident scenario and the 
mechanics of the injury for the jury. In Nash v. Kamrath, 
521 P.2d 161 (Ariz 1974), although the court refused to 
recognize "that failure to use a seat belt constituted a viable 
defense," it did affirm the trial court's admission of whether or 
not plaintiff was "using a seat belt" to show "the mechanics of 
the injury" and "the circumstances surrounding" the accident. 
Id. 521 P.2d at 164. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT 
A NEW TRIAL DUE TO JUROR USE OF A DICTIONARY RELATIVE 
TO THE WORD "PROXIMATE" DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH A 
DECISION OF THIS COURT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 43(2) 
AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW 
THAT HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT 
AS REQUIRED BY RULE 43(4) 
In the subject case, the Court of Appeals held: 
In this case, the record does not contain the actual 
definition of "proximate" the jury read nor identify 
the dictionary used. Without that definition we cannot 
compare the legal definition of "proximate cause" with 
the definition of "proximate" examined by the jury. In 
the absence of that crucial information, we do not find 
any basis for finding that substantial rights of defend-
ant where prejudiced by the juror's reference to the 
dictionary." (Exhibit A) 
There is no indication in the record the jury was influ-
enced by the dictionary definition of "proximate" in their delib-
erations or that their verdict would have been any different but 
for the definition. There was no prejudice to the defendant by 
reason of the juror's use of the dictionary. The definition of 
words in our standard dictionaries is taken as a matter of common 
knowledge which a juror is supposed to possess. 54 ALR 2d 
738, superceded by 31 ALR 4th 623 (1984). Whatever any 
individual juror may have understood "proximate" to mean it was 
applied equally to plaintiff and defendant. All jurors agreed 
unanimously to Questions 1-4 on the Special Verdict concerning 
negligence and proximate cause. 
It should be noted, however, that the critical issue in 
the subject case was negligence and not proximate cause. There 
is no record that defendant ever argued proximate cause to the 
jury. The final arguments were recorded but not transcribed (at 
the request of defendant's counsel) even though the Designation 
of Record filed by defendant's counsel ordered the entire tran-
script to the trial. 
In Pulkrabek v. Lampe, 293 P.2d 998 (Kan 1956) 
where the instruction on proximate case is extemely similar to 
the one given in this case, the court held as follows: 
Upon careful analysis of the heretofore quoted diction-
ary definition of the word "proximate" and the trial 
court's instruction regarding "proximate cause" we find 
nothing in the term "proximate," as defined, which can 
be regarded as inconsistent with the concept of "proxi-
mate cause" as set forthin the instructions. It 
follows we would not be warranted in holding that in 
and of itself the mere fact the jury read such defini-
tion is sufficient to make it affirmatively appear the 
substantial rights of the appellant were prejudiced by 
that action. (Emphasis added.) 
The court in Pulkrabek rejected plaintifffs contention the 
jury "might have been influenced" by the dictionary definition, 
noting that such a showing, 
"in our opinion, is not sufficient to comply with the 
established rule of this jurisdiction that a judgment 
will not be reversed unless it affirmatively appears 
the substantial rights of the parties complaining have 
been prejudiced thereby." 
* * # 
From the record presented it appears that the trial 
court, which we pause to note was in much better 
position to pass on the situation than this court, was 
convinced that the misconduct of the jury was not such 
that prejudice therefrom resulted against the 
appellant. ~. '. [T]his court has always held that an 
order allowing or denying a motion for a new trial will 
not be reversed unless abuse of discretion by the trial 
court is apparent. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "harmless error" is not a ground for granting a new 
trial unless it affects "the substantial rights of the parties." 
The rule concerning use of dictionaries followed by most courts 
has been stated in an annotation at 31 ALR 4th 623, 627 
(1984) as follows: 
"Courts appear willing to dismiss a juryfs consultation 
of dictionaries or encyclopedias as harmless error . . 
. . " (Emphasis added.) 
In the subject case, it was harmless error; it was not 
prejudicial; it did not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties; and it did not prevent either party from having a fair 
trial. 
Judge Cornaby, in ruling on defendant's Motion for a 
New Trial in the subject case, held as follows concerning the 
jurorfs use of the dictionary: 
"It was improper, of course, for the bailiff to give 
the jury the dictionary, even though—and the court 
recognizes that that is juror misconduct. The court 
had given a definition of "proximate cause" to the jury, 
and my guess is, if they had read it carefully they 
would have probably known what "proximate" meant. 
I still have to ask myself the question whether there 
was a reasonable possibility of prejudice on the part 
of the jurors by having that dictionary definition of 
"proximate," and since they alredy had the definition 
of "proximate cause" by the court, the court does not 
believe it falls in that category. 
And so, it's not a basis for the court granting a new 
trial on that basis." (Emphasis added.) (See Exhibit A.) 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is correct, and since it is not in conflict with 
any decision of this Court and does not involve important ques-
tions of state law that should be settled by this court, this 
court should deny defendant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 
Plaintiff has now waited almost 4 years since the jury awarded her 
what they and the court determined to be fair and just compensa-
tion for her injuries. Plaintiff is naturally frustrated with the 
appellate process which has taken so long, and now respectfully 
requests that this matter be brought to an end by this court deny-
defendant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari so that justice can 
be done and plaintiff can finally receive what she was awarded 
almost 4 years ago. 
DATED this 9th day of November, 1987. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
AAJLMXU^ \r) CL*^ 
Stephen G. Morgan (j 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument to be hand delivered on the 9th day 
of November, 1987, to Gary B. Ferguson and Michael K. Mohrman, 
SCB Tower, Suite 700, 50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84110. 
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EXHIBIT "A" Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 
(Utah App. 1987) 
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there is no significant justification for the 
state to intervene and speedily terminate 
the unwed father's constitutionally protect-
ed parental rights. Since Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4(3Xc) does not apply in this situa-
tion, we need not reach the due process 
question nor invoke the equitable powers 
of the court 
My colleagues are concerned that this 
result leaves no way to extinguish the pu-
tative father's parental rights in stepfather 
adoptions. I believe their rationale is con-
trary to the underlying legislative policies 
and the plain reading of the statute. I see 
nothing wrong with treating the natural 
father's rights and interests, in the step-
child adoption context, the same way those 
rights and interests have been treated his-
torically. That is, by use of consent or 
traditional abandonment procedures. Ap-
plication of the statute to the facts before 
us, requiring the filing of a paternity notice 
even though the mother has kept the child, 
might not pass constitutional muster. 
There could be abuse of the system by an 
unwed mother who, as here, would race to 
the courthouse with a petition for adoption 
signed by any petitioner available, solely to 
terminate the parental rights of a man she 
wants out of her life and her child's life. 
Karen HILLIER, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
William J. LAMBORN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860030-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 5, 1987. 
Automobile driver brought action 
against truck driver to recover damages 
for personal injury and property damage. 
The Davis County District Court, Douglas 
L. Cornaby, J., found truck driver 80% neg-
ligent and automobile driver 20% negligent. 
Truck driver appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) submis-
sion of sudden emergency instruction to 
jury was in accordance with automobile 
driver's theory of case and was supported 
by evidence; (2) seat belt evidence was 
inadmissible; (3) truck driver was not enti-
tled to new trial; and (4) award of $221,-
209.41 in damages was not shockingly ex-
cessive. 
Affirmed. 
1. Trial <3=>203(1) 
Trial court has duty to cover theories 
and points of law of both parties in its 
instructions, provided there is competent 
evidence to support them. 
2. Automobiles <s=>246(37) 
Submission of sudden emergency in-
struction to jury in personal injury and 
property damage case was in accordance 
with automobile driver's theory of the case 
and was supported by evidence, even 
though jury ultimately determined that 
automobile driver was 20% negligent; auto-
mobile driver testified that she saw truck 
some distance south of her, entirely on 
shoulder of road, moving slowly, automo-
bile driver could not determine what truck 
driver was doing but assumed he intended 
to slow truck to a stop and park it, when 
automobile driver was four or five car 
lengths from truck driver, he steered his 
truck into automobile driver's lane directly 
in front of her and he did not signal before 
driving onto road. 
3. Automobiles e=»209 
Automobile driver was not obviously 
negligent for failing to move into left lane 
prior to passing truck, which was moving 
slowly on shoulder of road; automobile 
driver was driving on two-lane road and 
should not necessarily have been expected 
to cross center line to avoid car driving 
slowly on shoulder. 
4. Automobiles e»243(17) 
Seat belt evidence was inadmissible in 
negligence action which arose prior to en-
actment of current statute which provides 
that failure to wear seat belt does not 
constitute contributory or comparative neg-
ligence and may not be introduced as evi-
dence in civil litigation on issue of injuries 
or on issue of mitigation of damages. U.C. 
A.1953, 41-6-186. 
5. Appeal and Error ®=1069.1 
Although jury's request in negligence 
action for a dictionary to look up the word 
"proximate" was improper and irregular 
and proper procedure would have been for 
jury to report difficulty regarding word to 
court and for court to instruct jury on 
definition, defendant was not entitled to a 
new trial; record did not contain actual 
definition of "proximate" which jury read 
or identify dictionary used and in the ab-
sence of that crucial information, there was 
no basis to find substantial rights of de-
fendant were prejudiced. 
6. Trial <3=>344 
Both plaintiffs and defendant's affida-
vits from jurors regarding a juror's use of 
dictionary were admissible under evidentia-
ry rule providing that juror may testify on 
question whether extraneous prejudicial in-
formation was improperly brought to jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence 
was improperly brought to bear upon any 
juror, since a question existed as to wheth-
er use of dictionary was prejudicial. Rules 
of Evid., Rule 606(b). 
7. Damages <3=>96, 104 
Juries are given wide discretion in as-
sessing damages. 
8. Damages <3=>132(1), 137 
Jury verdict in favor of automobile 
driver in the amount of $221,209.41 in per-
sonal injury and property damage action 
was supported by competent evidence and 
was not shockingly excessive in light of 
extensive injuries suffered by automobile 
driver in collision with truck. 
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Gary B. Ferguson, Michael K. Mohrman, 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
Stephen G. Morgan, Mark L. Anderson, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent 
Before GREENWOOD, BENCH and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff commenced this action against 
defendant to recover for personal injury 
and property damage she suffered as a 
result of an automobile accident with de-
fendant. The jury' found defendant 80% 
negligent, plaintiff 20% negligent and 
awarded plaintiff $221,209.41 in damages. 
Defendant appeals seeking a new trial or a 
reduction in the damages. 
At about 8:30 a.m. on November 13, 
1982, plaintiff was driving southbound on 
1-15 near Farmington, Utah when defend-
ant, who was driving south slowly on the 
right shoulder of the road, pulled out in 
front of her causing her to swerve sharply 
and her car to roll over. Plaintiff was 
thrown from the vehicle and suffered ex-
tensive injuries. 
The jury was instructed, over defend-
ant's objection, on the sudden emergency 
doctrine which states in part that a person 
who, without negligence on his part, is 
suddenly confronted with peril is not re-
quired to use the same judgment required 
in calmer moments. The court, however, 
refused to submit defendant's seat belt in-
struction to the jury and ruled that defend-
ant would not be allowed to present any 
evidence regarding seat belts. During jury 
deliberations one juror requested and re-
ceived a dictionary from the bailiff for the 
purpose of defining "proximate" in order to 
understand "proximate cause." After the 
jury returned its verdict a judgment was 
entered. This appeal followed the court's 
denial of defendant's motion for a new trial 
or, alternatively, reduction of damages. 
On appeal defendant claims the trial 
court erred in: 1) submitting the sudden 
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emergency instruction to the jury; 2) disal-
lowing the seat belt instruction and evi-
dence; 3) failing to grant a new trial due to 
the juror's use of a dictionary to define 
"proximate"; and 4) denying the motion 
for a new trial on the basis that the jury 
verdict was unreasonable and based on pas-
sion, prejudice and insufficient evidence. 
I 
Defendant first contends that the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury on the 
sudden emergency doctrine. Defendant ar-
gues the sudden emergency instruction 
was inappropriate because it requires plain-
tiff to be free of negligence. The instruc-
tion stated: 
A person, who without negligence on his 
part, is suddenly and unexpectedly con-
fronted with peril arising from either the 
actual presence or the appearance of im-
minent danger to himself or to others is 
not expected nor required to use the 
same judgment and prudence that may 
be required of him in calmer and more 
deliberate moments. 
In such a situation, his duty is to exercise 
only the degree of care which an ordi-
nary prudent person would exercise un-
der the same or similar circumstances. 
If, at that moment, he exercises such 
care, he does all the law requires of him, 
even though in the light of after-events, 
it might appear that a difference choice 
and manner of action would have been 
better and safer. 
Defendant points out that plaintiff was not 
negligence free because the jury found her 
20% negligent Defendant also claims that 
plaintiff was necessarily negligent because 
she failed to move into the left lane when 
she first saw defendant's truck on the side 
of the road and a non-negligent person 
would have changed lanes. 
Plaintiffs theory of the case, on the oth-
er hand, was that she was not negligent for 
failing to anticipate defendant's act of pull-
ing out in front of her. She claimed that 
defendant should have used his signal and 
looked behind him before pulling out into 
the right hand lane. Plaintiff asserts that 
the sudden emergency instruction was 
proper because it was consistent with her 
theory of the case. We agree. 
[1] The general rule is that a party is 
entitled to have his theory of the case 
submitted to the jury. Waiters v. Querry, 
626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981). The trial 
court has a duty to "cover the theories and 
points of law of both parties in its instruc-
tions, provided there is competent evidence 
to support them." Black v. McKnight, 562 
P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has examined 
the appropriateness of submitting a sudden 
emergency instruction to the jury in sever-
al cases. In Redd v. Airway Motor Coach 
Lines, Inc., 104 Utah 9, 137 P.2d 374 
(1943), Christiansen .v. Utah Transit 
AutL, 649 P.2d 42 (Utah 1982) and 
Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah 
1983), the Court found no error in the trial 
court's submission of a sudden emergency 
instruction. 
In Redd, the Court found the instruction 
proper where the jury was not compelled 
by the evidence to conclude that defendant 
was driving without due care. Redd, 137 
P.2d at 378. Similarly, in Christiansen, 
the Court upheld a sudden emergency in-
struction despite the fact that the jury 
found both parties partially negligent. The 
Court reasoned that the instruction was 
proper because it was supported by some 
evidence and by one of the parties' theo-
ries. Christensen, 649 P.2d at 47. Finally, 
in Anderson, the Court found no error 
where the sudden emergency instruction 
presented defendant's theory of the case 
that he had not acted negligently. 
Anderson, 671 P.2d at 174. 
[2,3] In this case, plaintiff testified 
that she saw defendant's truck some dis-
tance south of her, entirely on the shoulder 
of the road, moving south slowly. She 
could not determine what defendant was 
doing but assumed he intended to slow the 
truck to a stop and park it. (In fact, de-
fendant was "road hunting" for pheas-
ants.) When she was four or five car 
lengths from him, he steered his truck into 
plaintiff's lane directly in front of her. It 
is undisputed that defendant did not signal 
before driving onto the road from the 
shoulder. Plaintiffs theory of the case 
was that she was not at fault for failing to 
anticipate defendant's negligence in pulling 
out in front of her. The trial court's sub-
mission of the sudden emergency instruc-
tion to the jury was in accordance with 
plaintiffs theory of the case and was sup-
ported by evidence presented at trial. The 
jury's ultimate determination that plaintiff 
was 20% negligent does not nullify the 
propriety of the instruction. Likewise, we 
reject defendant's contention that plaintiff 
was obviously negligent for failing to move 
into the left lane prior to passing defend-
ant. Plaintiff was driving on a two-lane 
road and should not necessarily be expect-
ed to cross the center line to avoid a car 
driving slowly on the shoulder. The ques-
tion of plaintiffs negligence was a question 
of fact for the jury and the trial court could 
not conclude as a matter of law that plain-
tiff was negligent. 
Defendant cites two Utah cases which he 
contends are indistinguishable from this 
case and dictate reversal of the trial court's 
denial of the motion for a new trial. In 
Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 
474 (1971) and Keller v. Shelley, 551 P.2d 
513 (Utah 1976), the Court found as a mat-
ter of law that the sudden emergency or 
peril did not arise without fault by the 
defendants. In Solt, defendant, while driv-
ing his automobile, hit a two-year, eight 
month old child who followed a ball into the 
street. Defendant testified he was driving 
30 to 35 miles per hour when he observed 
the child come upon the roadway 60 to 80 
feet in front of him. Defendant applied his 
brakes but was unable to avoid striking the 
child. Defendant did not contend that 
there was any sudden darting and the 
Court found the sudden emergency instruc-
tion improper due to the absence of evi-
dence of a sudden or unexpected situation 
arising without the fault of defendant. 
The Court said the defendant saw what he 
should have seen all the time and was 
therefore negligent. The Court, in revers-
ing, noted that "[u]nder the evidence given 
in this case it is difficult to see how the 
jury could have found for the defendant 
unless they were misled by some instruc-
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Solt, 479 P.2d 
The case before this Court differs from 
Solt in two important respects. First, in 
this case, plaintiff contends defendant's act 
of pulling out in front of her caused a 
sudden and unexpected situation, whereas 
in Solt, no such claim was made. Second, 
there is substantial difference between a 
child chasing a ball into the street and an 
adult in an automobile pulling out in front 
of another vehicle without signaling. A 
young child is reasonably likely to run into 
a street in front of a car. Conversely, an 
adult would reasonably be expected to first 
look behind him and signal before pulling 
into the road from the shoulder. 
Similarly, Keller involves a situation 
where no evidence was submitted to dem-
onstrate a sudden and unexpected situation 
arising without fault on the part of the 
plaintiff. Keller, 551 P.2d at 514. In Kel-
ler, defendant, while passing another ve-
hicle, drove into the rear of plaintiff's ve-
hicle. The Court recognized that a driver 
intending to pass another vehicle must be 
certain that he can safely pass the other 
vehicle. When defendant attempted to 
pass, plaintiff was stopped waiting for traf-
fic to clear so she could make a left turn. 
The Court found the sudden emergency 
instruction improper because defendant 
was clearly negligent. Unlike Keller, in 
this case plaintiff was not undisputably 
negligent. Therefore, in light of plaintiff's 
evidence submitted at trial and her theory 
of the case, the instruction was proper. 
II 
[4] Defendant's next claim is that the 
trial court erred in refusing to allow evi-
dence concerning plaintiffs failure to wear 
a seat belt and by failing to submit an 
instruction to the jury that nonuse of a seat 
belt may mitigate damages. 
A majority of other jurisdictions have 
held that evidence of nonuse of a seat belt 
on the issue of mitigation of damages is 
inadmissible. Britton v. Doehring, 286 
Ala. 498, 242 So.2d 666, 671 (1970); Nash v. 
Kamrath, 21 Ariz.App. 530, 521 P.2d 161, 
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164 (1974); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 
392, 517 P.2d 458, 459 (1973); Lipscomb v. 
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del.Super. 
1967); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 726 
(D.C.1976); Hampton v. State Highway 
Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236, 248-
49 (1972); Sckmitzer v. Misener-Bennett 
Ford, Inc., 135 Mich.App. 350, 354 N.W.2d 
336, 340 (1984); Miller v. Haynes, 454 
S.W.2d 293, 300 (Mo.Ct.App.1970); Selgado 
v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 
579, 544 P.2d 719, 722 (1975); Fields v. 
Volkswagen, 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla.1976). 
We agree with the rationale of those cases 
and hold similarly that seat belt evidence is 
inadmissible in this case which arose prior 
to enactment of the present Utah statute.1 
Ill 
The third issue raised on appeal is wheth-
er the trial court erred in failing to grant a 
new trial due to the juror's2 use of a 
dictionary. According to affidavits sub-
mitted to the court, the jury, during delib-
erations, asked the bailiff for a dictionary 
to define "proximate" in order to under-
stand "proximate cause."3 The bailiff 
complied. 
[5] Clearly the jury's request for a dic-
tionary and consideration of "proximate" 
was improper and irregular. State v. Don-
ald, 90 Utah 533, 537, 63 P.2d 246, 248 
(1936). The jury was instructed that "it is 
your duty to follow the law as the court 
states it to you." The proper procedure 
would have been for the jury to report the 
difficulty to the court and for the court to 
instruct the jury on the definition of "proxi-
mate". Id. Despite the obvious improper 
conduct of the jury, such conduct must 
prejudice the substantial rights of defend-
ant to warrant reversal. Id.; Utah 
R.Civ.P. 61. 
In State v. Donald, the Utah Supreme 
Court held, in a forgery case, that a jury's 
1. At the time this case was tried, the legislature 
had not enacted Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186 
(1987) which provides that "failure to wear a 
seat belt does not constitute contributory or 
comparative negligence, and may not be intro-
duced as evidence in any civil litigation on the 
issue of injuries or on the issue of mitigation of 
damages." 
use of a dictionary to define "utter" did not 
prejudice the substantial rights of defend-
ant and did not warrant reversal. The 
Court explained that even if the judge had 
instructed the jury on the definition of "ut-
ter" it would have been the same in sub-
stance as the dictionary definition read by 
the jury. 
In this case, the record does not contain 
the actual definition of "proximate" the 
jury read nor identify the dictionary used. 
Without that definition we cannot compare 
the legal definition of "proximate cause" 
with the definition of "proximate" exam-
ined by the jury. In the absence of that 
crucial information, we do not find any 
basis for finding that substantial rights of 
defendant were prejudiced by the juror's 
reference to the dictionary. 
Plaintiff, who nonetheless saw fit to pro-
vide a counteraffidavit designed to diffuse 
the gravity of the juror's use of the dictio-
nary, claims the trial court erred in consid-
ering the affidavit due to the restrictions 
imposed by Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(2). Rule 
59(a)(2) states: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted .. for any of 
the following causes . . . (2) Misconduct 
of the jury; and whenever any one or 
more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, 
or to a finding on any question submitted 
to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of 
bribery, such misconduct may be proved 
by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
In several Utah cases, the Utah Supreme 
Court has interpreted Rule 59(a)(2) and 
held that the rule authorizes a jury verdict 
to be impeached by the affidavit of a juror 
only wheri the verdict was determined by 
chance or bribery. Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 
676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1983); Groen v. 
TRI-O-INC, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 
2. How many jurors used the dictionary is un-
clear. For simplicity we will refer to one juror. 
3. Both plaintiff and defendant submitted affida-
vits from different jurors regarding the use of 
the dictionary. 
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1983); Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 2d 240, 
408 P.2d 709, 710 (1965). The policy behind 
the narrow interpretation of the law was 
set forth in Wheat v. Denver & RG.W.R. 
Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952): 
To permit litigants to get jurors to sign 
affidavits or testify to matters discussed 
in connection with their functions as ju-
rors would open the door to inquiry into 
all manner of things which a losing liti-
gant might consider improper: miscon-
ceptions of evidence or law, offers of 
settlement, personal experiences, preju-
dice against litigants or their causes or 
the classes to which they belong. It 
would be an interminable and totally im-
practicable process. Such post mortems 
would be productive of no end of mis-
chief and render service as a juror un-
bearable. If jurors were so circum-
scribed in their deliberations, it is likely 
that judge and counsel would have to be 
present in the jury room attempting to 
monitor and regulate their thought and 
discussions into approved channels. 
Id. 250 P.2d at 937. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court lias 
narrowly interpreted 59(a)(2) and limited 
the circumstances under which jury affida-
vits may be admitted into evidence, the 
Court also adopted the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence on April 13, 1983 and made them 
effective as of September 1, 1983. Under 
Utah R.Evid. 606(b) "a juror may testify on 
the question whether extraneous preju-
dicial information was improperly brought 
to the jury's attention or whether any out-
side influence was improperly brought to 
bear upon any juror." The Court's adop-
tion of Rule 606(b) indicates an ititent to 
allow juror affidavits into evidence under 
the circumstances described in 606(b). In 
effect, Rule 606(b) provides another excep-
tion to the general rule that juror affidavits 
are inadmissible. 
[6] Applying 606(b) to the facts of this 
case, the dictionary was "extraneous infor-
mation." Clearly, the judge did not give 
the dictionary to the jury. Whether it was 
"prejudicial" was dependent upon the defi-
nition examined by the jury. Because a 
question existed as to whether or not use 
of the dictionary was "prejudicial," both 
affidavits were admissible under 606(b). 
IV 
[7] Finally, defendant argues that the 
jury verdict was unreasonable and was 
based on passion, prejudice and insufficient 
evidence. Juries are given wide discretion 
in assessing damages. Amoss v. Broad-
bent, 30 Utah 2d 165, 514 P.2d 1284, 1287 
(1973). When a jury determines a question 
of fact, its verdict will not be disturbed if it 
is supported by any competent evidence. 
Time Commercial Financing Corp. v. 
Davis, 657 P.2d 234, 236 (Utah 1982); Uin-
ta Pipeline Corp, v. White Superior Co., 
546 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1976); Nelson v. 
Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Utah 1975). 
Further, this Court will defer to the jury's 
verdict unless it is "so excessive as to be 
shocking to one's conscience and to clearly 
indicate passion, prejudice or corruption." 
McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 
62 Utah 115, 129, 218 P. 98, 104 (1923). 
[8] The record indicates that the jury's 
verdict is supported by competent evidence. 
Further, the damages awarded are not 
shockingly excessive in light of the exten-
sive injuries suffered by plaintiff. 
Affirmed. 
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur. 
Exhibit "B" Utah Court of Appeals' Order Denying 
Petition for Rehearing 
RECBVEU 
AUfi 8 » 1 9 8 7 
MORGAN, W U H . * * " * 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00000 
Karen Hillier, 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
William J. Lamborn, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 860030-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Defendant/ 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter, 
and the Court having duly considered said petition# 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant/Appellant's Petition 
for Rehearing be denied. 
Dated this 25th day of August, 1987. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Timothy M. 
Clerk of the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING by depositing the 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq. 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main, P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq. 
Mark L. Anderson, Esq. 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this 27th day of August, 1987. 
\kn KM A 
Karen Bean 
Case^Management Clerk 
Exhibit "C!! Utah Court of Appeals' Remittitur 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
October 9, 1987 
Karen Hillier# 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
REMITTITUR 
No. 860030-CA 
Case No. 34141 
William J. Lamborn, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered that the judgment of the trial court be and the same is 
hereby affirmed. 
Issued: August 5, 1987 
Record: five volumes, six envelopes 
Trial Court: Second District, Davis County 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
PARTIES: 
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq* 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main, P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq. 
Mark L. Anderson, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TRIAL COURT: 
Davis County Clerk 
Michael G. Allphin, Clerk 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84025 
CERTIFICATION: 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of October, 1987, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing REMITTITUR was mailed to each 
of the above parties by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid or by personally delivering the 
same. 
Karen Bean 
Case Management Clerk 
Exhibit "D" Partial Transcript of proceedings on 
April 17, 1987 (motion for new trial). 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
KAREN HILLIER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. LAMBORN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) REPORTER'S PARTIAL 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
) 
) Civil No. 34141 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Tuesday, April 17, 1984, 
the above-entitled matter came on for HEARING ON MOTIONS 
in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis Count 
State of Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY, 
Presiding. 
* * * * 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For t h e P l a i n t i f f : 
For the Defendant: 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN 
MARK L. ANDERSON 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GARY B. FERGUSON 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN 
Attorneys at Law 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
NANCY H. DAVIS 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Office: 451-3335 
1 I THE COURT: It was improper, of course, for the 
2 bailiff to give the jury the dictionary, even though—and 
3 J the Court recognizes that that is juror misconduct. The 
4 J Court had given a definition of proximate cause to the jury, 
5 and my guess is, if they had read it carefully they would have 
9 probably known what proximate meant. 
7 I I still have to ask myself the question whether 
3 there was a reasonable possibility of prejudice on the part of 
9 I the jurors by having that dictionary definition of proximate, 
2o| and since they already had the definition of proximate cause 
111 ^ t h e Court, the Court does not believe it falls in that 
12 category. And so, it's not a basis for the Court granting a 
131 new trial on that basis. 
14 The Court allowed the unexpected danger instruction. 
15 The jury must have believed it through the testimony of the 
15 plaintiff as opposed to the testimony of the defendant as to 
17| whose version of the facts were correct. If they had done 
18 that there is no way they could have arrived at the verdict 
19 the way they did. It was a proper instruction* That is not a 
20 ground for a new trial. 
21 The Court won't even comment on the seat belts. 
221 That was ruled on at trial. 
23 With regard to the renuttitur, the jury certainly 
24 found damages that were within reason of the testimony that 
25! was given. Could have well found more than they did and still 
X I been within reason. So, there is no grounds for the Court to 
2 grant a remittitur on that. 
3I As to the facts not supporting the verdict, there is 
4.1 no question in the Court's mind that the facts do support the 
5 verdict. The jurors just chose to believe the testimony of 
6 I the plaintiff as opposed to -whatever conflicting evidence may 
7I have been supported by the experts. 
& And, of course, the Court did exactly the same thing 
9 and so, I wouldn't be fojid to say that the jurors were 
lOj unreasonable in believing it or I would be saying I am un-
llj reasonable in believing it also. 
12] But, at any rate, your motion for a new trial is 
131 denied and the remittitur is denied. 
14 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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Exhibit TfElf District court's minute entry 
FILED IH CLERK'S OFFICE 
DAVIS C O J K T Y . UTAH 
JUDGES PRETRIAL CONFERENCE WORK SHEET E33 KD7 (8 AM (0: 29 
y ^ l*,L.\r.-L u . /V- ' - i inr.i wLLi,n 
^ A*4 frT-T&faAjxrt pendant 
Case No. 
Q 
i£T 
Attorney 
^ ^ -T*«r < * cc; </<z~ + : Date X^^. /<^ /^r^ 
x
- Issues: £o A^w^j S-C*, \d ,?«*//<?<>** ? 
'6 is 7 *&£" ' ~ ^ d « = c r . cc--ry"frf*/. 
37 •? C : _ 
r^ 
2. Stipulations: 
Judges Pretrial Conference Work Sheet Page 2 
3. Number of Witnesses: Plaintiff -" Defendant 
4. Exchange of Witnesses: '?/ /' f'J~> J) r~> / f* - / 
' < i 
/3s-- t<^,-* A<~:<~ r,-j ^>.w, ^  /^V.^-v ^V -X. • JV»,
 ifc 
>^ A.., f^*rt /.. '*. ff> Ar-„- Al. /V-r ^Oz -t^ " 
— • • -, <"l" / -.
 r f + , * , f 
.-.'XV^-zSen. ?/ £:<r,i-'r* **•.., /_..,—,-< r I/.-' I',' ,K'~-.t '*' /« -
5. Amendments to Pleadings: ' 
6. Trial Briefs or Memorandum of Points and Authorities: 
^ 
- / * • 
7. Trial: Non Jury Jury , / Has fee been paid /S? 
8. Jury Instructions supplied to Court ^ -/£ - j* #• days prior to trial. 
9. Length of Trial: J C'a.^ 5 Date of Trial a- . «-
10. Pre-trial Order prepared by A7 
11. Pre-trial Order to be prepared within ^o days prior to trial. 
12. Discovery to be completed J 2- - /£ - # ? day J yrim; M trial. 
13. List of witnesses and their addresses to be exchanged y<? days prior to trial. 
14. Inquire as to the possibility of settlement. 
Exhibit ffFtf District court's Pretrial Order framing issues for 
trial 
r.LcC ... f- - • » -' -'r' ••'-
" " , / • • t - r • ; * i . — » . j 
'„ V- - -• • •• -••• •' 
STEPHEN G. iMORGAN 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-7870 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN HILLIER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. LAMBORN, 
Defendant. 
. PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
) Civil No. 34141 
The above matter came before the Court on November 14, 1983, 
at a pre-trial conference held before the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby, District Judge, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Stephen G. Morgan appeared as attorney for Plain-
tiff and Robert G. Gilchrist appeared as attorney for Defendant. 
It was there ordered that a Pre-Trial Order be filed and signed by 
counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendant on or before February 1, 
1984. The following represents that Pre-Trial Order. 
1. JURISDICTION. This is an action to recover damages for 
personal injuries of Plaintiff. The jurisdiction of the Court is 
not disputed and is hereby determined by the Court to be present. 
•::* FEC -2 K! 2- kk 
.PL 
2. VENUE. Since the accident occurred in Davis County, 
State of Utah and both parties reside in Davis County, State of 
Utah, venue is not disputed and is hereby determined by the Court 
to be proper. 
3. GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES. 
(a) On November 13, 1982, on the frontage road abou 
1,000 feet North of Chase Lane near Centerville, Davis County, Uta 
an accident occurred, which plaintiff claims was.caused by defenda 
negligence in attempting to drive his vehicle in front of plaintif 
vehicle when plaintiff's vehicle was so close she could nor avoid 
a collision. Plainriff also claims that as a direct and proximate 
result of defendant's negligence that she sustained4 injuries and 
damages. 
(b) Defendant's Claims. Defendant claims that there 
was no negligence on his part and defendant further claims that 
plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence was the sole 
proximate cause or a contributing proximate*cause of plaintifffs 
injuries and damages, and further that such negligence was equal 
to or greater than the negligence, if any, of defendant. Defendant 
further claims that plaintiff did not suffer the injuries and 
damages to the extent alleged in her Complaint. 
4. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are establis 
by admissions in the pleadings or by stipulation of counsel: 
(a) On Novemver 13, 1982, on the frontage road about 
1,000 feet North of Chase Lane near Centerville, Davis County, 
State of Utah, an accident occurred which involved a venicle driven 
by plaintiff and a vehicle driven by defendant. 
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(b) As of December 5, 1983, plaintiff had incurred 
medical expenses of $51,345.90 plus an estimated additional medical 
expense from Dr. Patton as of that date of $1,200.00, all as a result 
of the injuries she received in the accident of November 13, 1982 
and said expenses are reasonable for the services rendered; however, 
defendant does not admit liability for said medical expenses. 
5. CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT. The contested issues of 
fact remaining for decision are: 
(a) Was defendant negligent? If so, was such 
negligence a proximate cause of the accident? 
(b) Was plaintiff negligent? If so, was such negli-
gence a proximate cause of the accident? 
(c) If both defendant and plaintiff are negligent, 
what percentage of fault is attributable to defendant and what 
percentage of fault is attributable to plaintiff? 
(d) What amount of damages will fully compensate 
plaintiff for the injuries and damages suffered as a result of the 
accident? 
6. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. There are no contested issues 
of law other than those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact. 
7. EXHIBITS. The following exhibits have been identified 
by the parties: 
(a) Plaintiff's exhibits. 
1. List or summary of medical expenses; 
2. List or summary of other special damages 
for loss of wages and earning capacity and future medical 
expenses; 
3. Hospital records and records of treating 
physicians, dentists, and other health care providers, 
including photographs and x-rays; 
4. Hardware taken out of plaintiff and photos; 
5» Charts, photographs and other documents prepar 
by investigating officers and accident reconstruction expert 
(b) Defendant's exhibits. 
1. Charts, photographs and other documents pre-
pared by investigating officers and accident reconstruction 
experts; 
2. Photographs and x-rays of plaintiff. 
(c) Exhibits identified will be marked at 8:30 a.m. 
on the date of trial, March 1, 1984, to the extent possible so as 
to avoid any unnecessary delay during trial. 
(d) Except as otherwise indicated, the Exhibits 
identified are subject to objections, if any, by the opposing party 
at the trial as to their relevency and materiality. If other 
exhibits are to be offered and their necessity reasonably can be 
anticipated, they will be submitted to opposing counsel at least on 
day prior to trial. 
8. WITNESSES. 
(a) Plaintiff's witnesses. 
In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counse 
to the contrary, plaintiff may call.as witnesses the following 
persons: (1) Karen Hillier; (2) Kevin Hillier; (3) Don Krambule; 
(4) June Krambule; (5) Rich Krambule; (6) Dr. Lower; (7) Dr. Patton 
(8) Dr. Jordan; (9) Dr. Lockharr; (10) Dr. DeDecker; (11) medical 
Records Custodian of University Medical Center; (12) Medical 
Records Custodian of Lakeview Hospital; (13) Trooper Brent Van Fleet; 
(14) other investigating officers; (15) Frank Grant; (16) David 
Stephens; (17) person knowledgable concerning where pheasant 
hunting can legally be done; (18) person knowledgable concerning 
Karen's employment and the effect which injuries have had on her 
work; (19) William J. Lamborn as an adverse witness; and (20) 
person knowledgeable concerning effect which injuries have had on 
Karenfs life. 
(b) Defendant's witnesses. 
In absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel 
to the contrary. Defendant may call as witnesses the following 
persons: (1) Trooper Brent Van Fleet; (2) Ron Wooley 
(c) In the event other witnesses are tc be called at 
the trial, a statement of their names and addresses and the general 
subject matter of their testimony will be served upon opposing 
counsel and filed with the Court at least the Monday prior to the 
Thursday trial date of March 1, 1984. This restriction shall not 
apply to rebuttal witnesses, the necessity of whose testimony canno. 
reasonably be anticipated before trial. 
9. REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS. This matter is scheduled for 
a jury trial. Requests for Instructions to the jury shall be 
submitted to the Court on or before February 16, 1984. Special 
requests for voir dire examination of the jury shall be submitted 
to Lhe Court by the afternoon prior to the commencement of trial. 
Counsel may supplement requested instructions during trial on 
matters nor reasonably anticipated prior to trial. 
10. AMENDMENTS TO PLEADING. There were no requests to 
amend pleadings. 
11. DISCOVERY. Discovery is to be completed on or before 
February 16, 1984. 
12. TRIAL SETTING. This case is set for trial with a jur 
f " • • 
on March 1, 1984 at 9:30 a.m. Estimated length of trial is three 
(3) days. Counsel shall be present at 8:30 a.m. on the date of 
trial to mark exhibits and to meet with the Court to handle any 
necessary matters prior to the commencement of trial at 9:00 a.m. 
13. POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. The possibility of settl 
is considered to be fair. 
DATED this ; day of February, 19 84. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge^ ' / 
The foregoing proposed Pre-Trial Order is hereby adopted t 
1st. day of February, 1984, prior to execution by the Court. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
NELSON 
Q~+ \s x / \ <A"*"s,v is 
0 . / 
Stephen G. Morgan T7 G^SBTT^i^tfsonf 
Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney \o£ Defe^/ant 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor CSB Tow^J 50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84i: 
Exhibit "G" District court's Instruction 11 on proximate cause. 
INSTRUCTION NO. // 
The proximate cause of an injury is-that cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and withour 
which the result would net have occurred. It is the efficient 
cause - the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors 
that accomplish the injury. 
